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 Abstract 
We study the link between culturally inherited household structure and wealth distribution in 
international comparisons using household data for the US and Spain (the SCF and the EFF). 
We estimate counterfactual US distributions relying on the Spanish household structure. Our 
results show that differences in household structure account for most of the differences in 
the lower part of the distribution between the two countries, but mask even larger 
differences in the upper part of the distribution. Imposing the Spanish household structure to 
the US wealth distribution has little effect on summary measures of inequality. However, this 
is the net result of reduced differences at the bottom and increased differences at the top. 
So there is distinct additional information in considering the whole distribution. We also 
report some evidence of an association between these wealth distribution differences and 
wealth composition. Finally, we present results for the within-group differences between the 
two countries using quantile regressions and find a reversing pattern by age. 
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1 Introduction and summary
Di¤erences in wealth distribution across developed countries are large. The estimated share
of the nations wealth held by the top 1 percent of the population, an often cited inequality
measure, may vary from 15 to 35 percent.1 Documenting these di¤erences is important in
at least two di¤erent contexts.
Firstly, distributional comparisons of net worth are obviously of interest in the literat-
ure on inequality measurement. Such interest comes from the fact that real and nancial
marketable assets can be readily used for consumption smoothing and intergenerational
transmission. The quality of wealth data based on household surveys available in many
countries is such that international comparisons of wealth distributions are now feasible.2
Secondly, the nature of these di¤erences may help to discriminate between alternative
economic theories of the distribution of wealth. The literature on computable general equilib-
rium models has tried to develop theories of saving behaviour that can endogenously produce
the form of distribution encountered in wealth data, given household-specic shocks from an
exogenous earnings process. Since the basic models fail to account for the facts, additional
features have been considered in the literature.3 Understanding international di¤erences can
be important for establishing which of these features matter if the features themselves are as-
sociated with institutional di¤erences across countries in, for example, business regulations,
welfare programs, bequests, or taxation.
However, the inuence of di¤erences in household structure on cross-country comparisons
may be important. For example, if two countries di¤er in the pattern of household formation
by young adults, not only the age distribution of households will di¤er but also the distri-
bution of household size and type. This raises the question to what extent the di¤erences
we observe in wealth distributions across countries persist for comparable households, and
to what extent they are due to di¤erences in household structure between countries. This
is important to elucidate because wealth magnitudes in micro surveys are usually measured
for households as opposed to individuals and the economic interpretation of the disparities
in the distribution can be very di¤erent in one case and the other. From an equity point of
1See for example the evidence in Davies and Shorrocks (2000).
2See Bover et al. (2005) for a comparison, based on micro data, between Italy, the UK, the US, and Spain,
using harmonized denitions of asset holdings from individual-country household surveys and the recently
created LWS database with wealth surveys from many countries.
3For useful summaries on the recent literature see for example Quadrini and Ríos-Rull (1997) and Cagetti
and De Nardi (2006). For earlier models see Atkinson and Harrison (1978) and Jenkins (1990).
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view di¤erences due to family demographics should probably be netted out.
Previous work on international comparisons treated households as homogeneous across
countries (except when trying to equivalize wealth by the number of household members).
This could be a good strategy when comparing countries such as the UK and the US where
demographic structure may be relatively similar.4 However, for general cross-country com-
parisons taking into account di¤erences in household structure becomes a more important
consideration.
Tables 1a and 1b show some characteristics of the wealth distributions for the US and
Spain, the countries we consider in this paper. It is noticeable that the sizeable di¤erences
in the summary measures for all households are considerably reduced when comparing more
homogeneous demographic groups, as for example households with head aged 35 to 54 and
living with a partner.
The age at which young people leave the parental home to establish their own household is
one key reection of long standing di¤erences in family systems between Western countries.
Other indicators are the prevalence of lone parent households or of elderly persons living
with their children. The sociology literature (see Reher 1998) identies two clearly di¤erent
geographical areas regarding family systems, one where family ties are strong (mostly Medi-
terranean countries) and another where these ties are weak (Northern Europe and the US).
In the former, children tend to leave home coinciding with marriage and may save up until
then, while in the latter they settle for an independent life as they reach maturity. These dif-
ferences exist at least since the 17th century when the earliest data are available. According
to the rst modern censuses, in the mid 19th century in Northern Europe between 30 and
55% of 15 to 24 years old of both sexes would leave the parental home and be servants with
another family, while only 5 to 20% of them would do so in Southern Europe where family
labour was much preferred. The factors shaping up these di¤erences could be partly traced
to the Germanic vs. Muslim and Oriental inuence, the Reformation in contrast to Cath-
olicism, and the earlier and more profound e¤ects of the Industrial Revolution in Northern
Europe (Reher 1998). Moreover, despite the fact that some convergence has occurred lately,
a clear divide remains. In Table 2 we report, for several Western countries, the proportion of
single person households, of lone parents families, and of 25-29 years old still living with their
4Nevertheless, Banks, Blundell, and Smith (2003) condition on three age bands when conducting part of
their UK vs. US comparison. Hyslop and Maré (2005) point out the inuence of changes in household types
on the increase in income inequality in New Zealand since the 1980s.
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parents. The divide between Northern and Southern countries is clear, and at the extremes
we observe Sweden with 44% of single person households and Spain with 16.9%.
In this paper we argue that the prevailing family systems in each country are important
to understand di¤erences in wealth inequality between countries. We study the implications
of the di¤erences in family structure for the comparison of wealth inequality between two
countries, one with weak family ties, the US, and another with strong family ties, Spain.
Moreover, for these two countries we have quite comparable wealth micro data (the SCF2001
and the EFF2002, respectively). We believe this approach could be useful more generally
when comparing wealth data across countries.
We take cross-country di¤erences in family structure as given. If these di¤erences were
endogenously determined to rst-order by di¤erences in wealth, our results, though still
valid from a descriptive point of view, would be less informative. Marriage and divorce
decisions are known to be inuenced by economic motives (Becker 1973). Moreover, recent
work by Guner and Knowles (2004) has considered a general equilibrium model of the joint
determination of marriage, divorce, and household savings, and compares its predictions
with those from more traditional macro models with exogenous marriages. In contrast, the
motivation of this paper is in conditioning on slow-moving aspects of household structure,
possibly generated by values or social norms. We emphasize the more exogenous fact that
young adults leaving their parents home at a later age in Spain (and other Southern type
countries) than in the US implies that certain types of households are rarer in Spain (and
others more abundant). It is noteworthy that strong family ties may override to a large
extent divorce outcomes. Reher (1998) describes that despite an increase in lone-parenthood
in recent years everywhere due to divorce and teenage pregnancies, there continue to be
important di¤erences in the levels between North and South-type countries. In Spain around
30% of all lone mothers with children co-reside with their own mother while only 15% of single
mothers live with their parents in the US (from Reher 1998, and London 1998, respectively).5
To assess the impact of household structure on the di¤erences in wealth distribution
between the US and Spain, we estimate non-parametrically the counterfactual distribution
that would have prevailed in the US if the demographic characteristics of households had been
similar to those prevailing in Spain. Following DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996) study
for earnings, we assess graphically what part of the di¤erences are attributable to di¤erences
5These gures refer to 1991 for both countries.
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in household structure for the entire wealth distribution.6 However, in contrast to those
authors, our main instrument of analysis is the evaluation of counterfactual cumulative
distribution functions rather than counterfactual densities. An advantage of comparing
conditional distributions rather than conditional densities is that one avoids the critical
issue of choice of smoothing method and the di¤erences in the results that may ensue. This
is particularly relevant in the case of wealth (as compared to income), given that there is
often a marked spike at zero because a non-negligible proportion of the population has no
wealth. Capturing these spikes complicates the estimation of densities and the results often
depend on the smoothing method adopted.
Furthermore, from the estimated counterfactual US distribution, we easily derive sum-
mary counterfactual distribution measures and compare them to the actual measures for the
US and Spain. Using them, we can decompose the di¤erence between the two countries in
measures of position and dispersion into a part due to di¤erences in household composition
and another part holding household composition constant. We also compare concentra-
tion measures. One interesting result of the paper is that imposing the Spanish household
structure to the US wealth distribution has little e¤ect on summary measures of inequality.
However, this is the net result of reduced di¤erences at the bottom and increased di¤er-
ences at the top. There is therefore distinct additional information in considering the whole
distribution.
Finally, it is also of interest to study in some detail the distributional di¤erences between
the US and Spain for given household types. To do so, we present quantile regressions
pooling the data for the two countries. We also provide plots of the within groups wealth
distributions for the di¤erent household types we consider in the paper.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the data used and the demo-
graphic structure of households adopted. We discuss as well the role of oversampling. In
Section 3 we derive the counterfactual US distribution from the US within-group wealth
distribution and the Spanish structure of households, and compare graphically the three
distributions. To further characterize the di¤erences between the two countries we also look
at portfolio composition. The counterfactual US density is also shown. In Section 4 we sum-
marize the di¤erences in the three distributions using measures of position, dispersion, and
concentration, and quantify how much of the di¤erences are due to household composition.
6Morissette, Zhang, and Drolet (2006) for Canada and DAmbrosio and Wol¤ (2006) for the US use this
methodology to study the changes in wealth inequality over time.
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We also identify which particular types of households contribute most to the estimated com-
positional di¤erences. In Section 5 we provide information about the di¤erences in wealth
distribution for given household types. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Data and demographic groups
The data come from the US Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) 2001 and the new Spanish
Survey of Household Finances (EFF) 2002.7 The focus of both surveys is to collect rich
information on household assets and debts together with socioeconomic variables relative to
households and their members. An important feature for a wealth survey that they have
in common is that the wealthy are oversampled. We construct comparable assets and debt
denitions from the variables in both surveys.
Measure of wealth. The wealth measure we use throughout this paper is net worth
dened as non-human assets minus debts. Assets include nancial assets, pension wealth,
main residence and other real estate wealth, business equity, vehicles and jewels and other
comparable valuables.8 Debts include all kinds of outstanding debts. All monetary amounts
are expressed in 2002 euros and have been adjusted for ination in the US and for purchasing
power parity for 2002.9
This is a measure of marketable wealth, as opposed to conceptually wider measures that
would include human wealth or Social Security type pension entitlements. In contrast with
income, marketable wealth comparisons provide information on di¤erences in consumption
smoothing possibilities over the life-cycle (specially when households are subject to liquidity
constraints) and in the scope for intergenerational transfers and inheritances.10
We checked that our results are not driven by potential di¤erences in the denition of the
unit of analysis in the two surveys. To this end we experimented with alternative denitions
taking into account the information provided for the US on the wealth of household members
who are outside the primary economic unit but share the same residence. Our results are
7For a full description of this survey see Bover (2004).
8Except Social Security pension provisions and, for the US, employer-sponsored dened-benet plans.
92002 US ination gure 1.6%; 2002 purchasing power parity for the US vis-a-vis of Spain 0.743. If
instead of adjusting for purchasing power parity we adjust only for the exchange rate the di¤erences between
Spain and the US are smaller when US wealth is below the Spanish one (but larger when above) since no
allowance is made for higher US prices.
10See the early emphasis on the marketability of wealth by the Royal Commission of Income and Wealth
(1975) in Britain.
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unchanged.
Demographic groups. In Table 3 we see that in the data used we observe the dif-
ferences pointed out in the previous section: more single person households in the US (40
vs. 29%), more lone parent households, in particular in the case of single female parent, 8%
in the US vs. 2% in Spain (the percentage of single male parent being very small in both
countries). Moreover the larger proportion of households headed by young in US is also
clear.
To characterize the structure of households in both countries, we consider 16 types of
households which di¤er in the age of the household head, marital status, gender of the head
of household in case of single households, and presence of children. The choice of groups is
based on the di¤erences in households structure between the two countries, as explained in
the previous section, making sure that a su¢ cient number of observations is available for
each group in each country. Furthermore, some robustness analysis with small variations
around this characterization were performed. The 16 groups considered may be found in
Table 4 which shows for each one its population share in both countries and the number of
observations available in our data.
In this paper we take the di¤erences in the mix of groups to reect mainly di¤erences
in household formation and structure but di¤erentials in gender mortality across countries
could also be thought to a¤ect the share of single women households among those over 54.
However, if we take for example the death rates of those born between 1930 and 1939 (i.e.
aged 63 to 72 in 2002) at 63, male death rates are higher than female rates by a larger
amount in Spain (.0090) than in the US (.0068).11 Therefore, gender mortality di¤erences
could not be behind the higher share of single women among households aged over 54 in the
US (29.7%) as compared to Spain (27.4%).
The US is ethnically and culturally more heterogeneous than Spain. It is well known
that race and religious attitudes correlate with demographic variables such as divorce rates
or the number of children. Di¤erences in demographic structures across countries may well
be associated with ethnic, religious or cultural di¤erences. However, we believe there is a
more direct association between wealth accumulation and household structure, operating,
for example, through household economies of scale or household dissolution. Establishing a
11Death rates by cohorts from the Human Mortality Database.
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link between household structure and cultural or ethnic diversity is outside the scope of this
paper.
Equivalence scales. A related but separate concern is the use of equivalence scales for
normalizing household wealth. Equivalizing wealth would require an intertemporal theoret-
ical framework, an avenue which is not pursued here. In this paper we aim to estimate to
what extent the demographic structure of households accounts for the di¤erences we observe
in wealth distributions, as opposed to trying to approximate personal wealth distributions
(for an attempt on the latter see Sierminska and Smeeding 2005). We argue that the dif-
ferences in household structure we consider are not just a question of size of household. In
Tables 1a and 1b we also report results when normalizing household wealth using a square
root equivalence scale or per capita wealth. As we can see, these standardizations reduce the
di¤erence in a measure of position like the median (although by less than in comparisons of
demographically comparable households), but not the di¤erence in measures of inequality.12
The critical role of oversampling in international wealth comparisons. In
Table 5 (second and fth row) we report standard errors for most of the distribution measures
we calculate in the paper. As we mentioned when describing the data, an important common
feature of the SCF and the EFF is that in both surveys the wealthy are oversampled. This
sampling feature is crucial for the precision of some wealth distribution statistics routinely
reported. To illustrate this point we also report bootstrap standard errors that would have
resulted from randomly sampling the US population (third row of Table 5).13 As can be seen,
for some of the statistics the di¤erence in precision is very substantial. For example, the 95%
condence interval for the percentage of wealth held by the top 1% of the population in the
absence of oversampling is almost as large as the international variation in this gure of 20
percentage points reported in Davies and Shorrocks (2000). In the absence of oversampling
we believe international comparisons should place the emphasis on less extreme points of the
distribution like quartiles or interquartile ranges, although this is not the case in our SCF
vs. EFF comparison.14
12Other normalizations, like wealth divided by number of adult members of the household (as chosen by
Davies, Sandstrom, Shorrocks, and Wol¤ 2006) provide similar results.
13US population obtained from the SCF sample and its population weights.
14Cowell and Flachaire (2007) examine the statistical performance of inequality indices, including the Gini
coe¢ cient, and show that these are very sensitive to the presence of extreme values.
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3 Counterfactual US wealth with Spanish household
structure
Estimation of the counterfactual US distribution. To estimate the counterfactual
US distribution we proceed by rst estimating the US empirical wealth distribution as follows:
bFUS(r) = cPrUS(w  r) = JX
j=1
cPrUS(w  rjz = j)cPrUS(z = j)
=
JX
j=1
26664
0BBB@
SUSX
s=1
 USs
SUSP
i=1
 USi 1(z
US
i = j)
1(wUSs  r)1(zUSs = j)
1CCCA
0BBB@
SUSX
s=1
 USs
SUSP
i=1
 USi
1(zUSs = j)
1CCCA
37775
where j (j = 1; :::; J) denotes the di¤erent types of households considered (in this case J = 16;
see Table 4), S is the sample size,  i are the population weight factors, and 1(A) denotes the
indicator function for event A. For each group j (i.e. for each type of household) we evaluate
the conditional probability (rst term). This term reects the US within groups wealth
distribution. To obtain the US empirical distribution function, this conditional probability
for each group is weighted by its US population marginal probability. Similarly, we evaluate
the empirical wealth distribution for Spain, bFSP :
The counterfactual US distribution, i.e. the US within groups distribution with the
Spanish structure of household is given by
bF SPUS (r) = JX
j=1
cPrUS(w  rjz = j)cPrSP (z = j);
i.e. we replace the marginal US probabilities by the Spanish ones.
Our aim in this paper is to evaluate up to what extent the larger wealth inequality
observed in the US relative to Spain is due to di¤erences in the structure of households
between the two countries. To this end, we study if the di¤erences between the US and Spain
are reduced or amplied when the Spanish distribution is compared with a counterfactual
US distribution with the same structure of households.
Of course one could also evaluate the counterfactual Spanish distribution but the in-
terpretation would be di¤erent (and consequently the results too). By focusing on the US
counterfactual we are aiming at looking how the US distribution would change if the struc-
ture of households was similar to the Spanish one while looking at the Spanish counterfactual
8
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would reect an interest in studying how the Spanish distribution would change. Given that
the US is a reference country and that there are less di¤erences between groups in Spain, in
this paper we study the former.
One important component of household wealth which di¤ers markedly across countries
is owner occupied housing. An illustrative and interesting example of the previous general
method is to look at di¤erences in the proportion of owner occupied housing. In the US 68%
of households own their main residence while 82% do so in Spain. However the di¤erences
across di¤erent types of households are substantial. In the US house-ownership varies from
4% for single males aged under 25 to 89% for couples over 55. When weighting the US shares
of owner occupiers for each household type (column 1 in Table 6a) by the Spanish population
probabilities for each group type (column 2 in Table 4), the counterfactual US percentage of
the population owning their main residence goes up to 75%. Therefore, half of the di¤erence
in the proportion of owner occupied housing between the US and Spain could be attributed
to di¤erences in the types of households prevailing in both countries.
The empirical cumulative distribution functions for the US, Spain, and the counterfactual
US are plotted in Figure 1. The di¤erences between the US and Spain distributions and
between the US and the counterfactual US are shown in Figure 2.15 Household wealth in
the US is lower than in Spain up to approximately the 67th percentile. At this point the
two distributions cross and the situation is reversed.
These gures make clear that there are considerably more households with zero or very
low wealth in the US as compared to Spain. However, the household structure prevailing in
the US as compared to Spain explains a large part of this di¤erence, as the counterfactual US
distribution reveals. Indeed, the di¤erence between the US and Spain is greatly reduced when
looking at the di¤erence between the US and the US counterfactual up to approximately
the 50 to 60th percentiles. For the rst part of the distribution the counterfactual US lies
between the US and the Spanish ones. In contrast, for the upper half of the distribution
counterfactual US wealth is higher than both the US and the Spanish ones. This indicates
that if the structure of households in the US was the same as in Spain, the di¤erences in
household wealth between the US and Spain would be even larger than the observed ones for
the upper half of the distribution. The likely explanation is that there are more households
in Spain of the type that in the US have high wealth (e.g. couples over 54, as we will see
15The gures reect wealth values up to 99% of the Spanish wealth distribution for the scale to be visually
meaningful.
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later).
To further characterize the di¤erence between the two countries we look at portfolio
composition. The proportion of owner occupied housing by groups and the counterfactual
US rate presented in Table 6a point to an association between the di¤erences in the lower
part of the wealth distribution (and in the earlier part of the life-cycle) and home ownership.
In Tables 6b and 6c we report the proportion of wealth invested in nancial assets and the
percentage of households that own nancial assets (other than bank accounts and deposits).16
Table 6b shows the overall rates for the US, Spain, and the US counterfactual while in Table
6c we provide more details on these rates for the 16 groups considered. From Table 6b we see
that counterfactual US participation in nancial assets other than bank accounts (73.9%)
and portfolio share in nancial assets (41.8%) would be more similar to US gures (71% and
41.2%, respectively) than to Spanish ones (35% and 12%) and even higher than in the US.
This result, together with the detailed rates by groups in Table 6c, suggest an association
between the share of nancial wealth in household portfolios and the size of the di¤erence
between the upper parts of the wealth distributions of the two countries.
In the Appendix we provide plots for the three estimated wealth densities. These are
dependent on the smoothing assumptions adopted but similar conclusions emerge.
4 Summary measures for the counterfactual US distri-
bution
In this Section we provide some measures to summarize the di¤erences in the overall distri-
butions and to quantify for these measures the di¤erence when only household composition
changes and the di¤erence for the same household composition.
Di¤erences in measures of position and dispersion along the distribution when
only household structure di¤ers. From the previously estimated counterfactual distri-
bution the calculation of percentiles is straightforward (e.g. the median, p50, is the smallest
value of r for which bF SPUS (r)  0:5): In Table 7 we report various measures of position and
dispersion for the three distributions. In Table 8 we decompose the di¤erences between the
US and Spain for the previous summary measures in the following way:
mSP  mUS = (mSP  mSPUS) + (mSPUS  mUS)
16Bank accounts and deposits are held by 91% of households in the US and 98% in Spain.
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(m representing any of those measures). The rst term reects the di¤erence in wealth
for the same household composition and the second the di¤erences when only household
composition changes.
The numbers in Tables 7 and 8 reect what was anticipated from looking at the graphs
of the three cumulative distribution functions (Figure 1). Firstly, we can quantify to what
extent applying the Spanish marginal probabilities to the within groups US wealth distribu-
tion reduces the observed di¤erences in wealth distribution between the US and Spain for
the rst part of the distribution (up to approximately the 60th percentile). For example,
the percentage of households with zero or negative net worth for the US would go from
9.6% to 6.4%. The role of household composition is the largest around the median where
the US median would increase from the actual 65800 to the counterfactual 91600, much
closer to the Spanish 101900 value when changing only household composition, reducing the
di¤erence with the US by 71.5%. Furthermore, household composition accounts for 55% of
the di¤erence in inter-quartile range. More in detail, it is more relevant for the di¤erence
between the median and the lower quartile (63%) than of the di¤erence between the median
and the upper quartile (13%).
However, for the upper part of the distribution the situation is reversed and the di¤erences
in household structure between the US and Spain are instead masking di¤erences in the
distribution of wealth between the two countries that are larger when the same household
composition is considered. These di¤erences are the largest around the 75th percentile. At
that point, where the US p75 is larger than the Spanish one, the counterfactual US would
exceed both. If it werent for the di¤erence in household composition (columns 5 and 6 in
Table 8) the di¤erence between Spain and the (counterfactual) US would be 2.75 times the
actual US vs. Spain di¤erence. These di¤erences diminish further up in the distribution, as
the corresponding values for the 90th percentile show.
Types of households that make the compositional di¤erence. In what follows
we try to learn more about where these di¤erences come from, namely which particular types
of households among the 16 considered are behind these estimated composition di¤erences.
To this end in Table 9 we vary the proportion of types of households in the US one type at
a time. Specically, we divide households into two types: the group of interest and the rest.
Then we see how US wealth at various percentiles (p25, median, and p75) would change if
11
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only the proportion of households in the US of that particular type would change to be the
Spanish one. Thus, for each group j we obtain counterfactual medians (and p25, p75) from
distributions of the form:
bF SPUS[j](r) = cPrUS(w  rjz = j)cPrSP (z = j)+cPrUS(w  rjz 6= j)cPrSP (z 6= j) (j = 1; :::; J):
The results in the table show that it is mostly (i) couples aged 55 and over followed by
(ii) very young single women and couples (<25), (iii) single women under 55 with children
and (iv) couples aged 35 to 55 with children that are responsible for the changes in the
counterfactual US distribution. For example, if we single out the group of single female
households with children aged between 25 and 34 vs. the rest and change their relative
weights in the US population (2.4% and 97.6%, see Table 4) by the Spanish weights (0.3%
and 99.7%) the US median would increase by 4100 euros. In the cases of couples aged under
25 the increase in the US median would be 3800. Households in (ii) and (iii) have typically
low wealth in both countries (see for example the median by groups in Table 4) and the higher
incidence of those types of households in the US as compared to Spain is responsible for a
large part of the estimated increase in counterfactual US wealth as compared to US wealth.
In contrast we see that the low incidence of couple households over 55 in the US (19.7%)
compared to Spain (28.2%) and of couples with children aged 35 to 55 (16% vs. 20.9%)
pushes down the US quantiles, proportionately more at the median and above. These are
typically rich households and if their share in the US were to be the one prevailing in Spain
the US median would go up by 10900 and 3800 euros, respectively, and the US 75th percentile
by 28400 and 6900 (see Table 9).
Summary inequality measures: Lorenz, Gini, and share of wealth held by
top percentiles. Summary inequality measures usually reported in the literature are the
Lorenz curve and the Gini coe¢ cient. We report them although they may not be very in-
formative about where in the distribution di¤erences occur and being expectational measures
su¤er from sensitivity to extreme values.
The Lorenz curve is given by:
L(F (r)) =
E(W jw  r)F (r)

 H(r)

where  = E(W )
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The Gini coe¢ cient is dened as the ratio of the areas on the Lorenz curve diagram:
G = 1  2
Z 1
0
L(p)dp  1  2E[H(W )]

:
The counterfactual US Lorenz curve can be calculated as the empirical counterpart to:
LSPUS =
HSPUS (r)
SPUS
where
HSPUS (r) =
JX
j=1
EUS[1(W  r)W jz = j] Pr SP (z = j)
and
SPUS =
JX
j=1
EUS[W jz = j] Pr SP (z = j):
Similarly, the counterfactual US Gini coe¢ cient is given by:
GSPUS = 1 
2
SPUS
JX
j=1
EUS[H
SP
US (W )jz = j] Pr SP (z = j):
Note that to evaluate the cumulative net wealth share for the US counterfactual, the US
population weight factor for each household has to be corrected by the relative number of
households in the group for Spain relative to the US, i.e.
SSPP
i=1
1(zSPi =j)
SUSP
i=1
1(zUSi =j)
.
In Figure 3 the Lorenz curves for the US, Spain and counterfactual US wealth distribu-
tions are plotted. As expected, the curve for the Spanish distribution is nearer to the line of
perfect equality than the US curve. The Lorenz curve for the counterfactual US distribution
is distinctly nearer to the perfect equality curve than the US, but closer to the US curve than
to the Spanish one. Although too small to be noticeable in the graph, some negative values
for the cumulative net wealth shares are observed (the minimum being -0.15 for Spain and
-0.44 for the US) given the existence of negative values for net wealth. A useful discussion on
how to apply the methods commonly used to summarize income distributions to the study
of wealth distributions given the peculiarities of wealth (i.e. non-negligible zero and negative
values etc.) is Jenkins and Jäntti (2005). As for the values of the Gini coe¢ cient these are
0.80 for the US, 0.56 for Spain, and 0.78 for the US counterfactual.17
We see that in contrast to what we found with position and dispersion measures along
the distribution, Gini and Lorenz curve results do not vary as much between the US and the
17In the presence of negative values the Gini coe¢ cient is not bounded by one. Chen et al. (1982) propose
a normalization.
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counterfactual US distributions. However, this is the net result of reduced di¤erences at the
bottom and increased di¤erences at the top. This shows that very distinct information has
been gained by comparing the entire wealth distribution as opposed to summary measures
of inequality.
Sampling design has a large impact on the statistical precision of Gini coe¢ cients. In
parallel with the calculations reported in Table 6, we obtained bootstrap standard errors for
the US Gini coe¢ cient (0.8) using the SCF with oversampling and an equivalent random
sample. The former is .003 and the latter is almost ve times larger (.014). The Gini
coe¢ cient for Spain is 0.56 with a bootstrap standard error with oversampling of .011.
In Table 10 we report some additional concentration measures for the three distributions,
namely the percentage of total wealth held by some top percentiles. We see that in line with
Gini and Lorenz curve results, summary concentration measures do not vary very much
between the US and the counterfactual US distributions.
Generalized Lorenz curve. Although wealth is less unequally distributed in Spain
than in the US (and than in counterfactual US), since the US and counterfactual US means
exceed the Spanish mean we cannot say which distribution is to be preferred. Therefore we
briey analyse the Generalized Lorenz curve dened as
H(r) = E(W jw  r)F (r):
That is, the Lorenz curve multiplied by the mean or, equivalently, the cumulative mean
wealth at each point of the cumulative population share. While Lorenz type of criteria
ignore the size of overall wealth, this is not the case for the Generalized Lorenz.
Figure 4 contains the Generalized Lorenz curves for the three distributions. When size is
taken into account, the Generalized Lorenz curve for the counterfactual US distribution lies
closer to the Spanish one for 90% of the population and only for the top 10% it resembles
more the US one. Furthermore, since the Generalized Lorenz curve for the US and the
counterfactual US distributions do not cross, there is unambiguous social welfare ordering
in favour of the counterfactual US as compared to the US. Comparing Spain to the US or
the counterfactual US there are trade-o¤s between gains for the lower percentiles and losses
for the wealthier given the observed crossing of its the curve with the other two. In the case
of Spain vs. the US there are gains for 90% of the population in Spain as compared to the
US and losses for the wealthier 10%.
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5 Within group di¤erences
Comparing within-group distributions across countries. Finally, we provide in-
formation about di¤erences across countries in the wealth distribution for given household
types. In Figure 5 we plot the conditional wealth distributions in the US and in Spain,
for each of the 16 types of households. We observe that for some types of households the
conditional distributions are very similar in the two countries. This is the case for example
of groups 1 (couples less than 25) or 8 (single female aged 25 to 34 with children). On the
contrary for some other groups (e.g. couples 55 or over and single females without children
aged 35 to 54 -groups 14 and 12, respectively) they are quite di¤erent.
To have more precise measures of the di¤erences in conditional distributions between the
two countries in Table 11 we present quantile regressions for the 25th percentile, the median,
and the 75th percentile. Sample sizes on which these conditional distributions are based
prevent us to explore more extreme quantiles. The specication of these quantile regressions
is the following:
Q (W jzi) = 11(z = 1) + 11(z = 1)DSP + :::+ 161(z = 16) + 161(z = 16)DSP
where  = 0:25; 0:50; and 0:75 and DSP is a zero-one dummy for Spain.
In the Table we report only the coe¢ cients measuring the di¤erence of the Spanish
conditional quantiles with respect to the US for each of the 16 groups (i.e. the s). Couples
aged 25-34 with children have signicantly higher wealth in Spain than in the US at all
quantiles considered; namely 20900 euros at p25, 44300 at the median, and 56400 at p75.
In contrast, couples over 54 have signicantly less wealth in Spain than in the US at all
points of the distribution (i.e. 14500 less at p25, 98500 at the median, and 301900 at p75).
Interestingly, couples aged in between (i.e. aged 35 to 54) with children are better o¤ in
Spain in the rst part of the distribution, worse o¤ in the upper half, and not signicantly
di¤erent at the median.
Another group for which signicant di¤erences occur at all points of the conditional
distribution are single females aged 35 to 54, specially those without children, who have
signicantly less wealth in the US. For other groups where di¤erences in the conditional
distributions between the two countries occur, these are more limited to certain parts of the
distribution.
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6 Concluding remarks
In this paper we highlight the link between culturally inherited household structure and
wealth distribution. To this end we compare two countries with very di¤erent family struc-
tures, the US and Spain, using the US Survey of Consumer Finances 2001 and the Spanish
Survey of Household Finances (EFF) 2002 and construct the US counterfactual wealth dis-
tribution.
We nd that for the rst part of the distribution controlling for household demographics
explains a great deal of the observed di¤erence between the US and Spain. It accounts for
71% of the di¤erence in the median between the two countries and for 55% of the di¤erence
in inter-quartile range. In contrast, for the upper part of the distribution the di¤erences in
family structure are masking the extent of the di¤erences between the two countries. Indeed,
these di¤erences become larger when the same household structure is assumed. For example,
at the 75th percentile the di¤erence between Spain and the counterfactual US would be 2.75
times the actual US vs. Spain di¤erence.
We also analyse actual and counterfactual measures of wealth inequality in the two coun-
tries. Interestingly, our results show that imposing the Spanish household structure to the
US wealth distribution has little e¤ect on summary measures of inequality. However, this
is the net result of reduced di¤erences at the bottom and increased di¤erences at the top,
highlighting that relevant distinct information may be missed if the entire distribution is not
considered.
Sample error in international comparisons of wealth inequality measures may be of rst-
order importance. In our case, we have su¢ cient statistical precision in the comparison
thanks to having oversampling of the wealthy in both surveys.
As an illustrative example of the importance of di¤erences in household structure we
calculate the percentage of owner occupied housing that would prevail in the US if the
demographic structure of households was similar to the one in Spain. We estimate it to be
75%, in between the 68% of the US and the 82% of Spain. Furthermore, we present some
evidence of an association between the observed di¤erences in wealth distribution and the
shares of real and nancial wealths.
We identify the main groups of households that are behind the di¤erences between the
counterfactual and the actual US distributions. These are (i) couples aged 55 and over, (ii)
very young single women and couples (aged < 25), (iii) single women under 55 with children
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and (iv) couples aged 35 to 54 with children. For example, if the percentage of households
with a couple older than 54 in the US was the one prevailing in Spain (i.e. 28.2% instead of
19.7%) the US median would increase by 10900 euros, and the 25th and 75th percentiles by
3300 and 28400 euros, respectively.
Looking at comparable household groups, the main feature that emerges is how di¤erences
between the US and Spain in household wealth change over the life-cycle for a large group
of the population, namely couples (with children when young), giving rise to an interesting
reversing pattern.18 In the US they are signicantly worse o¤ at all quartiles when young
(aged 25-34), signicantly better o¤ at all quartiles when old (over 54), and worse o¤ in the
rst part of the distribution but better o¤ in the upper part when aged in between (i.e. aged
35 to 54).
Overall we believe that international comparisons may be useful to construct models
that uncover the mechanisms that generate observed wealth data. Theoretical models that
try to explain observed wealth distributions have focused on Britain (see Atkinson and
Harrison 1978) or the US (see for example Quadrini and Ríos-Rull 1997, De Nardi 2004,
and references therein). They have compared the predictions from their models to Inland
Revenue data or US household wealth data from the SCF, respectively. As household survey
data become available for other countries, the di¤erences observed between countries may
provide useful information on the mechanisms governing household wealth accumulation.
However, theoretical models have traditionally focused on trying to explain observed Gini
coe¢ cients and concentration wealth measures, like the share of wealth held by the upper
percentiles of the population. As we have shown in this paper, standard inequality measures
may mask signicant di¤erences across countries in various parts of the distribution that
cancel each other in the summary statistics.
18Given the cross-section nature of our data we cannot distinguish between life-cycle and cohort e¤ects.
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Table 1a. Summary statistics for US and Spanish wealth distributions,
all and selected groups (1)
Gini Median1 No of
observations
All households
US 0.80 66 4442
Spain 0.56 102 5143
Households with head aged
35 to 54
US 0.77 79 1994
Spain 0.54 114 1717
Households with head aged
35 to 54 and couple
US 0.74 118 1427
Spain 0.52 121 1293
Households with head aged
35 to 54, couple, one child <16
US 0.74 121 297
Spain 0.50 118 417
All households, using square root
equivalence scale (
p
no of hh members)
US 0.80 45 4442
Spain 0.56 62 5143
All households, per capita
(scaling by no of hh members)
US 0.81 31 4442
Spain 0.58 37 5143
1In thousands of euros.
Sources: United States: Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) 2001
Spain: Spanish Survey of Household Finances (EFF) 2002
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Table 1b. Summary statistics for US and Spanish wealth
distributions, all and selected groups (2)
p75/p25 p25/p50 p75/p50 p90/p50
All households
US 22.7 0.15 3.4 8.5
Spain 4.3 0.42 1.8 3.2
Households with head aged
35 to 54
US 13.6 0.21 2.9 6.7
Spain 3.8 0.46 1.8 2.9
Households with head aged
35 to 54 and couple
US 8.1 0.32 2.6 5.6
Spain 3.6 0.50 1.8 2.9
Households with head aged
35 to 54, couple, one child <16
US 8.1 0.31 2.5 4.9
Spain 3.5 0.52 1.8 2.7
All households, using square root
equivalence scale (
p
no of hh members)
US 22.5 0.15 3.4 8.6
Spain 4.3 0.44 1.9 3.3
All households, per capita
(scaling by no of hh members)
US 22.5 0.15 3.3 9.0
Spain 4.5 0.43 1.9 3.7
Sources: SCF 2001 and EFF 2002
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Table 2. Household types: indicators for some Western countries
% of single person % of lone parent families % aged 25-29 still
households (of fam. with children <18) living with parents
(1990/1991)1 (1989/1991)2 (1994)3
Men Women
Sweden 44.0 22.3 - -
Denmark 38.1 22.0 - -
Netherlands 37.7 18.1 - -
Germany 37.7 15.7 28.8 12.7
UK 30.0 19.4 20.8 10.8
US 29.2 23.5 15.6 8.8
France 29.2 11.9 22.5 10.3
Italy 23.7 - 66.0 44.1
Greece 21.1 - 62.6 32.1
Spain 16.9 8.6 64.8 47.6
1Reher (1998) from Eurostat for Europe using census and register data; CPS US Census
Bureau fron Census 2000. More recent gures on single person households are available
for European countries from the ECHP which provide gures broadly comparable to those
shown.
2Fernández-Cordón and Tobio (1998) from INSEE; Bureau of Labor Statistics
3Fernández-Cordón (1997) from Eurostat for Europe; CPS US Census Bureau
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Table 3. Household types in the US and Spain,
by demographic characteristics (%)
US Spain
Couple vs single
couples 60 71
single male 14 10
single female
no children 18 17
with children 8 2
Age of household head
<25 6 2
25 <35 17 12
35 <55 43 42
55 34 44
Presence of children under 16
no 66 69
yes 34 31
Sources: SCF 2001 and EFF 2002
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Table 4. Information on the 16 household groups considered
Percentage in Median No of observ.
population net wealth1 in the sample
US Spain US Spain US Spain
Age < 25
1. couple 2.4 0.6 5.8 12.0 78 18
2. single male 1.4 0.6 2.0 3.2 52 20
3. single female 1.8 0.4 0.3 6.5 57 18
25 Age <35
couple
4. no children 3.4 4.0 34.5 71.0 121 98
5. children 6.9 5.4 26.0 70.2 242 149
6. single male 2.6 1.7 9.7 62.6 94 62
single female
7. no children 1.9 1.1 6.1 30.4 72 47
8. children 2.4 0.3 1.8 10.8 89 10
35 Age <55
couple
9. no children 12.0 12.0 118.6 130.0 560 486
10. children 16.0 20.9 117.5 116.1 867 807
11. single male 5.2 3.6 36.5 78.5 215 163
single female
12. no children 5.4 3.9 25.0 108.1 203 190
13. children 4.2 1.3 11.7 68.4 149 71
Age  55
14. couple 19.7 28.2 220.9 122.4 1102 1938
15. single male 4.4 3.8 85.0 86.1 191 283
16. single female 10.2 12.1 60.7 78.6 350 783
1In thousands of euros.
Sources: SCF 2001 and EFF 2002
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Table 5. Precision of wealth distribution measures:
oversampling vs. random sampling
% of wealth held by top
p101 p251 p501 p751 p901 p75-p25p25 50% 20% 10% 5% 1%
US
point estimate 0.05 9.7 65.8 221.1 562.7 21.7 97.1 82.2 69.0 56.9 32.1
standard error with
 oversampling 0.06 0.5 2.1 5.0 14.2 1.1 0.1 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.5
 random sample 0.08 0.8 2.9 7.4 24.5 1.7 0.2 1.3 2.2 3.0 4.0
Spain
point estimate 6.4 43.2 101.9 185.7 330.2 3.3 86.4 58.6 41.8 29.5 13.2
standard error with
oversampling 1.0 2.0 2.8 3.3 10.3 0.2 0.5 1.0 1.3 1.5 1.6
1In thousands of euros.
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Table 6a. Percentage of owner occupiers, by type of households
US Spain US with Spanish
mix of households
Overall 67.7 81.9 74.9
Age < 25
couple 21.0 41.7
single male 3.9 49.2
single female 11.7 49.4
25 Age <35
couple
no children 56.4 79.5
children 63.8 73.9
single male 35.2 55.6
single female
no children 25.4 53.3
children 25.1 59.6
35 Age <55
couple
no children 81.4 83.4
children 83.3 83.3
single male 54.3 67.0
single female
no children 51.2 78.9
children 48.6 65.9
Age  55
couple 89.3 90.5
single male 75.4 77.1
single female 67.1 82.6
27
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Table 6b. Financial assets: wealth share1 and participation rates2(%)
US Spain US with Spanish
mix of households
Financial assets share 41.2 12.0 41.8
Percentage of households
holding nancial assets
 All nancial assets 71.0 35.2 73.9
(excluding bank accounts)
 Stocks 21.7 12.5 24.3
 Mutual funds 21.5 7.2 24.2
 Fixed-income securities 18.9 1.9 20.6
 Pension schemes 61.6 24.1 65.1
1Wealth in nancial assets (including bank accounts and deposits, stocks, mutual funds, xed-
income securities, and pension schemes) over wealth (including debts).
2Percentage of households holding various types of nancial assets (excluding bank accounts
and deposits).
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Table 6c. Financial assets: group composition (%)
Wealth share Participation1
US Spain US Spain
Overall 41.2 12.0 71.0 35.2
Age < 25
couple 38.2 7.7 56.5 37.7
single male 71.7 13.0 49.8 13.2
single female 16.5 9.0 30.0 23.7
25 Age <35
couple
no children 31.0 5.0 75.4 26.6
children 29.9 7.8 72.6 39.7
single male 29.1 11.0 64.8 32.5
single female
no children 42.0 8.8 62.3 24.0
children 47.4 2.3 45.1 9.0
35 Age <55
couple
no children 40.8 15.9 81.6 47.1
children 34.3 11.6 82.2 48.6
single male 44.8 11.7 77.2 31.7
single female
no children 44.8 9.8 66.0 42.0
children 34.3 7.6 58.9 15.7
Age  55
couple 46.9 13.8 78.3 32.1
single male 48.6 16.7 64.2 22.6
single female 50.5 9.8 54.5 16.4
1 % of households holding nancial assets (including shocks, mutual funds, xed-income
securities, and pension schemes) excluding bank accounts and deposits.
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Table 7. Summary wealth distribution measures for the US,
Spain, and US with Spanish structure of households
US Spain counterfactual US
mUS mSP mSPUS
% households
net worth 6 0 9.6 1.4 6.4
p101 0.04 6.4 1.7
p251 9.7 43.2 22.6
Median1 65.8 101.9 91.6
Mean1 299.8 160.4 367.3
p751 221.1 185.7 282.9
p901 562.7 330.2 664.0
p75-p25
p25 21.7 3.3 11.5
p50-p25
p25 5.7 1.4 3.0
p75-p50
p50 2.3 0.8 2.1
p90-p50
p50 7.5 2.2 6.2
1 In thousands of euros.
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Table 8. Decomposing the di¤erences in wealth distributions
between the US and Spain: Summary measures
Total di¤erence Di¤erence for same Di¤. when only household
household composition composition changes
mSP-m1US % mSP-m
SP1
US % m
SP
US-m
1
US %
% households
net worth 6 0 -8.2 100 -5.0 61.0 -3.2 39.0
p10 6.3 100 4.6 73.4 1.7 26.6
p25 33.5 100 20.6 61.4 12.9 38.6
Median 36.1 100 10.3 28.5 25.8 71.5
Mean -139.4 100 -206.9 148.4 67.5 -48.4
p75 -35.4 100 -97.1 274.5 61.7 -174.5
p90 -232.6 100 -333.8 143.5 101.3 -43.5
p75-p25
p25 -18.4 100 -8.2 44.6 -10.2 55.4
p50-p25
p25 -4.3 100 -1.6 37.2 -2.7 62.8
p75-p50
p50 -1.48 100 -1.28 86.5 -0.2 13.5
p90-p50
p50 -5.3 100 -4.0 75.5 -1.3 24.5
1 p10, p25, Median, Mean, p75, and p90 in thousands of euros.
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Table 9. Di¤erence due to household composition, by household groups1:
varying one group at a time
p25 Di¤ with2 p50 Di¤ with p75 Di¤ with
US p25 US p50 US p75
Age < 25
couple 11.0 1.3 69.7 3.8 227.8 6.7
single male 10.7 1.0 67.6 1.8 223.1 1.9
single female 11.2 1.5 68.8 3.0 225.3 4.2
25 Age <35
couple
no children 9.7 -0.03 65.7 -0.15 220.5 -0.6
children 9.9 0.2 67.9 2.0 224.3 3.2
single male 10.1 0.4 66.4 0.6 222.1 1.0
single female
no children 10.2 0.4 66.6 0.7 222.4 1.3
children 11.3 1.6 70.0 4.1 228.0 6.8
35 Age <55
couple
no children 9.7 0 66.0 0.1 221.1 0
children 11.2 1.5 69.6 3.8 228.0 6.9
single male 9.7 0 66.3 0.4 222.1 1.0
single female
no children 10.0 0.3 66.9 1.1 223.2 2.1
children 11.0 1.2 69.6 3.8 228.0 6.9
Age  55
couple 13.0 3.3 76.7 10.9 249.5 28.4
single male 9.7 -0.02 65.8 0 221.1 0
single female 9.8 0.05 65.7 -0.1 220.5 -0.6
1 In thousands of euros.
2 Memo from Tables 7 and 8 (when varying all groups at the same time):
p25US=9.7, p25SPUS=22.6, p25
SP
US p25US=12.9
p50US=65.8, p50SPUS=91.6, p50
SP
US p50US=25.8
p75US=221.1, p75SPUS=282.9, p75
SP
US p75US=61.7
(note that in the case of quantiles the sum of the di¤erences for each group is not equal
to the overall di¤erence)
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Table 10. Gini and wealth concentration measures for the
US, Spain, and US with Spanish structure of households
% of total wealth held by top
Gini 1% 5% 10% 20% 50%
US 0.80 32.1 56.9 69.0 82.2 97.1
Spain 0.56 13.2 29.5 41.8 58.6 86.4
US with Spanish structure 0.78 30.0 55.3 67.1 80.1 96.0
of households
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Table 11. Quantile regressions for the conditional distributions1
p25 p50 p75
Age < 25
couple 1.2 6.3 15.2
single male 2.8 1.1 104.5
single female 4.6 12.0 52.3
25 Age <35
couple
no children 29.3 36.5 3.6
children 20.9 44.3 56.4
single male 4.8 52.9 52.0
single female
no children 3.0 24.3 76.8
children 1.1 9.0 27.0
35 Age <55
couple
no children 26.8 11.4 -65.3
children 18.5 -1.4 -107.6
single male 11.8 42.1 -8.2
single female
no children 39.3 83.1 73.2
children 9.8 56.7 55.2
Age  55
couple -14.5 -98.5 -301.9
single male 10.6 1.1 -32.3
single female 22.0 17.9 -2.2
1 The coe¢ cients reported reect the di¤erence of the Spanish conditional quantile with
respect to the US one for each of the 16 groups. In thousands of euros.
2 * 5% signicance, ** 1% signicance
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Figure 1: Empirical wealth distributions
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Figure 2: Di¤erence between the empirical distribution functions
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Figure 3: Lorenz curves
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Figure 4: Generalized Lorenz curves
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Figure 5: Conditional distributions, by type of household
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Appendix: Counterfactual US density and density di¤erences
We provide plots for the three estimated wealth densities. These are derived as the
di¤erence between consecutive points in the cumulative distribution and using the smoothing
Stata defaults for width and kernel (i.e. Epanechnikov). Figure 1A displays the densities
and Figure 2A directly the di¤erences in densities.
-100 0 100 200 300 400 500 1000
Net Wealth (in thousand euros)
US Spain
US with Spanish household structure
Figure 1A: Estimated densities
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Figure 2A: Di¤erence between the estimated densities
39
BANCO DE ESPAÑA      47 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0804 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA PUBLICATIONS  
WORKING PAPERS1  
0701 PRAVEEN KUJAL AND JUAN RUIZ: Cost effectiveness of R&D and strategic trade policy. 
0702 MARÍA J. NIETO AND LARRY D. WALL: Preconditions for a successful implementation of supervisors’ prompt 
corrective action: Is there a case for a banking standard in the EU? 
0703 PHILIP VERMEULEN, DANIEL DIAS, MAARTEN DOSSCHE, ERWAN GAUTIER, IGNACIO HERNANDO, 
ROBERTO SABBATINI AND HARALD STAHL: Price setting in the euro area: Some stylised facts from individual 
producer price data. 
0704 ROBERTO BLANCO AND FERNANDO RESTOY: Have real interest rates really fallen that much in Spain? 
0705 OLYMPIA BOVER AND JUAN F. JIMENO: House prices and employment reallocation: International evidence. 
0706 ENRIQUE ALBEROLA AND JOSÉ M.ª SERENA: Global financial integration, monetary policy and reserve 
accumulation. Assessing the limits in emerging economies. 
0707 ÁNGEL LEÓN, JAVIER MENCÍA AND ENRIQUE SENTANA: Parametric properties of semi-nonparametric 
distributions, with applications to option valuation. 
0708 ENRIQUE ALBEROLA AND DANIEL NAVIA: Equilibrium exchange rates in the new EU members: external 
imbalances vs. real convergence. 
0709 GABRIEL JIMÉNEZ AND JAVIER MENCÍA: Modelling the distribution of credit losses with observable and latent 
factors. 
0710 JAVIER ANDRÉS, RAFAEL DOMÉNECH AND ANTONIO FATÁS: The stabilizing role of government size. 
0711 ALFREDO MARTÍN-OLIVER, VICENTE SALAS-FUMÁS AND JESÚS SAURINA: Measurement of capital stock 
and input services of Spanish banks. 
0712 JESÚS SAURINA AND CARLOS TRUCHARTE: An assessment of Basel II procyclicality in mortgage portfolios. 
0713 JOSÉ MANUEL CAMPA AND IGNACIO HERNANDO: The reaction by industry insiders to M&As in the European 
financial industry. 
0714 MARIO IZQUIERDO, JUAN F. JIMENO AND JUAN A. ROJAS: On the aggregate effects of immigration in Spain. 
0715 FABIO CANOVA AND LUCA SALA: Back to square one: identification issues in DSGE models. 
0716 FERNANDO NIETO: The determinants of household credit in Spain. 
0717 EVA ORTEGA, PABLO BURRIEL, JOSÉ LUIS FERNÁNDEZ, EVA FERRAZ AND SAMUEL HURTADO: Update of 
the quarterly model of the Bank of Spain. (The Spanish original of this publication has the same number.) 
0718 JAVIER ANDRÉS AND FERNANDO RESTOY: Macroeconomic modelling in EMU: how relevant is the change in regime?
0719 FABIO CANOVA, DAVID LÓPEZ-SALIDO AND CLAUDIO MICHELACCI: The labor market effects of technology 
shocks. 
0720 JUAN M. RUIZ AND JOSEP M. VILARRUBIA: The wise use of dummies in gravity models: Export potentials in 
the Euromed region. 
0721 CLAUDIA CANALS, XAVIER GABAIX, JOSEP M. VILARRUBIA AND DAVID WEINSTEIN: Trade patterns, trade 
balances and idiosyncratic shocks. 
0722 MARTÍN VALLCORBA AND JAVIER DELGADO: Determinantes de la morosidad bancaria en una economía 
dolarizada. El caso uruguayo. 
0723 ANTÓN NÁKOV AND ANDREA PESCATORI: Inflation-output gap trade-off with a dominant oil supplier.  
0724 JUAN AYUSO, JUAN F. JIMENO AND ERNESTO VILLANUEVA: The effects of the introduction of tax incentives 
on retirement savings. 
0725 DONATO MASCIANDARO, MARÍA J. NIETO AND HENRIETTE PRAST: Financial governance of banking supervision.
0726 LUIS GUTIÉRREZ DE ROZAS: Testing for competition in the Spanish banking industry: The Panzar-Rosse approach 
revisited. 
0727 LUCÍA CUADRO SÁEZ, MARCEL FRATZSCHER AND CHRISTIAN THIMANN: The transmission of emerging market 
shocks to global equity markets. 
0728 AGUSTÍN MARAVALL AND ANA DEL RÍO: Temporal aggregation, systematic sampling, and the 
Hodrick-Prescott filter. 
0729 LUIS J. ÁLVAREZ: What do micro price data tell us on the validity of the New Keynesian Phillips Curve? 
0730 ALFREDO MARTÍN-OLIVER AND VICENTE SALAS-FUMÁS: How do intangible assets create economic value? An 
application to banks. 
                                                           
1. Previously published Working Papers are listed in the Banco de España publications catalogue. 
0731 REBECA JIMÉNEZ-RODRÍGUEZ: The industrial impact of oil price shocks: Evidence from the industries of six OECD 
countries. 
0732 PILAR CUADRADO, AITOR LACUESTA, JOSÉ MARÍA MARTÍNEZ AND EDUARDO PÉREZ: El futuro de la tasa de 
actividad española: un enfoque generacional. 
0733 PALOMA ACEVEDO, ENRIQUE ALBEROLA AND CARMEN BROTO: Local debt expansion… vulnerability 
reduction? An assessment for six crises-prone countries. 
0734 PEDRO ALBARRÁN, RAQUEL CARRASCO AND MAITE MARTÍNEZ-GRANADO: Inequality for wage earners and 
self-employed: Evidence from panel data. 
0735 ANTÓN NÁKOV AND ANDREA PESCATORI: Oil and the Great Moderation. 
0736 MICHIEL VAN LEUVENSTEIJN, JACOB A. BIKKER, ADRIAN VAN RIXTEL AND CHRISTOFFER KOK-SØRENSEN:  
A new approach to measuring competition in the loan markets of the euro area. 
0737 MARIO GARCÍA-FERREIRA AND ERNESTO VILLANUEVA: Employment risk and household formation: Evidence 
from differences in firing costs. 
0738 LAURA HOSPIDO: Modelling heterogeneity and dynamics in the volatility of individual wages. 
0739 PALOMA LÓPEZ-GARCÍA, SERGIO PUENTE AND ÁNGEL LUIS GÓMEZ: Firm productivity dynamics in Spain. 
0740 ALFREDO MARTÍN-OLIVER AND VICENTE SALAS-FUMÁS: The output and profit contribution of information 
technology and advertising investments in banks. 
0741 ÓSCAR ARCE: Price determinacy under non-Ricardian fiscal strategies. 
0801 ENRIQUE BENITO: Size, growth and bank dynamics. 
0802 RICARDO GIMENO AND JOSÉ MANUEL MARQUÉS: Uncertainty and the price of risk in a nominal convergence 
process. 
0803 ISABEL ARGIMÓN AND PABLO HERNÁNDEZ DE COS: Los determinantes de los saldos presupuestarios de las 
Comunidades Autónomas. 
0804 OLYMPIA BOVER: Wealth inequality and household structure: US vs. Spain. 
 
Unidad de Publicaciones
Alcalá, 522; 28027 Madrid
Telephone +34 91 338 6363. Fax +34 91 338 6488
e-mail: publicaciones@bde.es
www.bde.es
